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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJECT: MBFR: FIFTH REVISION OF SPC'S VERIFICATION PAPER

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: A) USNATO 1099; B) USNATO 2477

THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF FIFTH REVISION TO SPC'S VERIFICATION PAPER WHICH IS CIRCULATED AT MAY 10 SPC MEETING. NEW TEXT SUPERCEDES THAT CONTAINED REF A AND TAKES INTO ACCOUNT PROPOSED FRG AMENDMENTS REPORTED REF B.

BEGIN TEXT

I. INTRODUCTION

1. THE BASIC ALLIED POSITION ON VERIFICATION IN MBFR IS CONTAINED IN C-M(73)83(FINAL), PARAGRAPH 15, WHICH READS AS
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FOLLOWS: "ANY MBFR AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, IINCLUDING NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS BEARING IN MIND THAT THE MODALITIES AND EXTENT OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING INSPECTION, SHOULD DEPEND ON THE CNTENT AND NATURE OF

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THE AGREEMENTS REACHED. NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS. ANY MBFR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE WITHOUT ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATED PROVISIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION. IT IS NEVERTHELESS DESIRABLE TO SEEK MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS."

2. IN ADDITION, PARAGRAPH 32 STATES: "THE ALLIES WILL ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY SEEK AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT, TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND TO ENHANCE WARNING IN THE EVENT OF A PACT BUILD-UP. ALL VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS MEANS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES."

3. PARAGRAPH 33 STIPULATES THAT "NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE ANECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS", AND THAT " IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK AGREEMENT ON OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES (I.E. ADVERSARY ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURES) APPLICABLE TO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA." IT STATES THAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED PROPOSALS ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION IS REQUIRED.

4. WITHIN THESE TERMS OF REFERENCE, THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, WITH MILITARY/TECHNICAL INPUT FROM THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN CONSIDERING OVERT VERIFICATION POSSIBILITIES AND DEVELOPING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. THIS REPORT CONTAINS THE COMMITTEE'S FINDINGS. IT RECOMMENDS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ACCEPTABLE AND FEASIBLE NEGOTIATED INSPECTION POSSIBILITIES, RECOGNISING OF COURSE THAT THE FINAL CHOICE OF MEEASURES AND THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EACH IN ANY OVERALL INSPECTION SCHEME CAN BE DECIDED ONLY AS THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION DEVELOPS. /AS CONCRETE CONCEPTIONS ON THE CONTENT AND NATURE OF THE AGREEMENTS TO BE REACHED EXIST ONLY FOR THE FIRST PHASE AND, MOREOVER, THE POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY OF CERTAIN VERIICATION MEASURES CANNOT BE FORESEEN AT PRESENT FOR THE ENTIRE MBFR PROCESS, A NEGOTIATING POSITION
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FOR THE FIRST PHASE ONLY WILL BE PROPOSED./

II. GENEAL CONSIDERATIONS
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

5. THE ALLIES RECOGNISE THAT NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF ANY MBFR AGREEMENT. /IN THIS CONTEXT THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES IN THE ANALYSIS OF DATA ARRIVED AT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS NEEDS TO BE SOLVED./ OR / A QUESTION RELATED TO THIS POINT IS THE INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM THE ALLIANCE WILL USE TO ARRIVE AT VERIFICATION JUDGEMENTS. THIS WILL REQUIRE A SEPARATE STUDY AT A TIME WHEN THE NATURE OF THE

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OVERT VERIFICATION SYSTEM HAS BECOME CLEARER. IN THE MEANTIME,
IT IS RECOGNISED THAT THE ALLIES WILL BE INTERESTED IN SHARING
INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR REACHING INDEPENDENT AND COLLECTIVE
JUDGEMENTS REGARDING WARSAW PACT COMPLIANCE WITH ANY MBFR
AGREEMENT./ OR /A QUESTION RELATED TO THIS POINT IS THE
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM THE ALIANCE WILL USE TO ARRIVE AT
VERIFICATION JUGEMENTS. IT IS RECOGNISED THAT THE ALLIES ARE
DEPENDENT ON US INFORMATION IN ORDER TO REACH CORRECT JUDGEMENTS
REGARDING WARSAW PACT COMPLIANCE WITH ANY MBFR AGREEMENT./
ADVANTAGES OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION

6. THE ALLIES WILL SEEK OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES
(I.E. ADVERSARY ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURES) SINCE THEY COULD
HAVE THE ADVANTAGES OF:

(A) ENABLINGTHOSE ALLIED COUNTRIES WITH LITTLE OR NO
NATIONAL TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MEANS TO PARTICIPATE
ACTIVELY IN THE VERIFICATON PROCESS;
(B) PROVIDING MORE DIRECT MBFR MONITORING FOR ALL ALLIED
COUNTRIES INVOLVED;
(C) MEETING ALLIED DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
REQUIREMENTS. OVERT MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION WOULD
BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN PURELY NATIONAL MEANS IN
BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PARLIAMENTS AND IN PUBLICS
THAT THE MBFR AGREEMENTS WERE BEING OBSERVED AND
THAT VIOLATORS WOULD BE DETECTED. EVEN IF THE WESTERN
VERIFICATION PROPOSALS WERE REJECTED, THE ALLIES'
ADVOCACY OF OVERT INSPECTION WOULD BE A PUBLIC
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DEMONSTRATION OF THEIR GOOD FAITH WITH REGARD TO MBFR;
(D) BEING MORE EFFECTIVE THAN NATIONAL MEANS IN PROVIDING
A BASIS FOR CONFRONTING A VIOLATOR WITH EVIDENCE OF
HIS VIOLATION. SINCE THE EVIDENCE WOULD BE GATHERED
BY SEVERAL NATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, IT
WOULD BE MORE CREDIBLE THAN IF GENERATED EXCLUSIVELY
BY NATIONAL MEANS. IT WOULD ALSO BE MORE LIKELY TO
BE RELEASABLE THAN NATIONAL EVIDENCE, SINCE THE LATTER
IS OFTEN DETECTED OR PRIMARILY EVALUATED THROUGH HIGHLY
CLASSIFIED MEANS;
(E) FILLING GAPS AND RESOLVING AMBIGUITIES IN EXISTING
INFORMATION AND SHORTENING THE TIME REQUIRED TO MAKE
VERIFICATION JUDGEMENTS;
(F) DETERRING VIOLATIONS BY INCREASING THE POSSIBILITY OF
THEIR DETECTION;

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(G) /INCREASING WARNING TIME (1), A VERY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO NATO'S SECURITY WHICH WOULD RESULT FROM OVERT VERIFICATION/ OR /PROVIDING AS AN INCIDENTAL BONUS ENHANCED WARNING TIME(2), A VERY IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO NATO'S SECURITY WHICH COULD RESULT FROM OVERT VERIFICATION, PARTICULARLY IF APPLIED TO A WIDER GEOGRAPHIC AREA./ THE AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL WARNING TIME CANNOT BE QUANTIFIED PRECISELY. ANY ADDITIONAL WARNING TIME WOULD BE OF VALUE IN MANAGING A CRISIS SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE;
(H) INDICATING WILLINGNESS OF THE TWO SIDES TO BE MORE OPEN ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THEREBY ENHANCING EAST-WEST CONFIDENCE.

RECIPROCITY /AND ACCEPTABILITY/

7. ANY NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES AGREED UPON WOULD HAVE TO BE APPLIED RECIPROCALLY. IN GENERAL IT SEEMS UNLIKELY
SECRET

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THAT THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD ACCEPT ON THEIR TERRITORY ARRANGEMENTS SO INTRUSIVE THAT RECIPROCAL APPLICATION WOULD HARM WESTERN INTERESTS. NEVERTHELESS, EACH POSSIBLE OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANY AGREED REDUCTION MEASURES, MUST BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED TO DETERMINE WHETHER ITS APPLICATION ON ALLIED TERRITORY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE(3). /IN VIEW OF THE POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES WHICH INSPECTIONS MIGHT HAVE FOR THE STATES CONCERNED, ONLY SUCH MEASURES SHOULD BE AGREED AS ARE ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFICATION. A BALANCED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN POSSIBLE POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES AND THE EXPECTED BENEFITS OF THE RESPECTIVE MEASURES SHOULD BE

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SOUGHT./

NON-INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

8. NO OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE ACCEPTED
WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE SOVIETS MEANS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN
EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES. /HOWEVER, THE PRESENCE
AND LEGAL ACTIVITIES OF WARSAW PACT INSPECTORATES ON THE ALLIED
TERRITORY CONCERNED WOULD NOT PER SE NECESSARILY CONSTITUTE
INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS./

/POSSIBLE MEASURES OUTSIDE NATO GUIDELINES AREA/

9. /TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED, THERE SHOULD BE OVERT
VERIFICATION OF ANY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED TO APPLY
OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION IN GENERAL AND FOR THE PROTECTION OF
THE FLANKS IN PARTICULAR, WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO THE PROVISIONS
OF PARAGRAPH 17 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL./ OR /THE POSSIBILITY OF
OVERT VERIFICATION OF ANY MEASURES WHICHMIGHT BE NEGOTIATED TO APPLY
OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION IN GENERAL AND FOR THE PROTECTION OF
THE FLANKS IN PARTICULAR, WITHOUT DETRIMENT TO THE PROVISIONS
OF PARAGRAPH 17 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL./ OR /THE POSSIBILITY OF
OVERT VERIFICATION OF ANY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED
TO APPLY OUTSIDDE THE CENTRAL REGION IN GENERAL AND FOR THE
PROTECTION OF THE FLANKS IN PARTICULAR SHOULD BBE TAKEN INTO
CONSIDERATION//

STAFFING OF INSPECTORATES

SECRET

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10. SUBJECT TO FURTHER ALLIED STUDIES, INSPECTORATES IN
THE CENTRAL REGION WOULD BE STAFFED WITH PERSONNEL FROM THOSE
NATIONS WITH FORCES OR TERRITORIES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA;
FLANK COUNTRIES WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY INSPECTORATES WHICH
MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION. /ANY AGREEMENTS
ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION SHOULD CONTAIN PROVISIONS FOR THE
ASSIGNING OF ALLIED (INCLUDING HOST COUNTRY) LIAISON OFFICERS
TO WARSAW PACT INSPECTION TEAMS ON ALLIED TERRITORY, AND VICE
VERSA. HOWEVER, IN PUTTING FORWARD THEIR PROPOSALS FOR OVERT
VERIFICATION, THE ALLIED NEED NOT FROM THE BEGINNING INCLUDE A
PROVISION FOR ATTACHING LIAISON OFFICERS TO INSPECTORATES. THEY
COULD, AT FIRST, LEAVE IT TO THE OTHER SIDE TO REQUEST THEIR
INCLUSION. HOWEVER, IN CASE THE OTHER SIDE SHOULD NOT MAKE SUCH
APROPOSAL, THE ALLIES SHOULD AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME, INTRODUCE
TIS ITEM INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS. IN ANY CASE, THEY SHOULD SEEK
EASTERN AGREEMENT TO SPECIFIC RULES WHICH WOULD REGULATE
LIAISON OFFICER ACTIVITY./ OR /IN PUTTING FORWARD THEIR
PROPOSALS FOR OVERT VERIFICATION, THE ALLIS AGREE NOT TO
INCLUDE A PROVISION FOR ATTACHING LIAISON OFFICERS TO INSPECTORATES.
SHOULD THE SOVIETS LATER REQUIRE THEIR INCLUDION, THE ALLIES
WILL BE PREPARED TO ACCEDE TO SUCH A PRINCIPLE. IN DOING SO,

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HOWEVER, THEY WOULD INFORM THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR ACCEPTANCE
OF THE PRINCIPLE WILL BE CONTINGENT ON EASTERN AGREEMENT TO
SPECIFIC RULES WHICH WOULD REGULATE LIAISON OFFICER ACTIVITY./

ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL

11. NEGOTIATED OVERT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES BY THE ALLIES
SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED BY NATO. POLICY GUIDANCE SHOULD EMANATE
FROM THE COUNCIL AND OVERALL TECHNICAL DIRECTION SHOULD BE
CARRIED OUT BY A COMPETENT HEADQUARTERS ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL.

12. THE PRODUCT OF NEGOTIATED OVERT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES
BY ALLIED COUNTRIES SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY
TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.

NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

13. THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO
VERIFICATION TO THE EXTENT THAT IT IS LINKED TO REDUCTION
MEASURES ON WHOSE SUBSTANCE THEY MAY HAVE ALREADY AGREED.
SECRET

THEREFORE, THE ACCEPTABILITY OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WOULD BE
INCREASED IF THEY WERE PUT FORWARD ONLY AT A RELATIVELY LATE
STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN, IN ARGUING FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE,
THE ALLIES CAN RELATE THEM TO THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF REDUCTIONS.

14. INDEPENDENTLY OF THE TABLING OF ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS,
THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE OTHER SIDE AT ALL STAGES
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THE WEST WANTS OVERT VERIFICATION AS A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

15. VERIFICATION ARANGEMENTS AGREED FOR FIRST PHASE
REDUCTIONS ARE LIKELY TO INFLUENCE SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS FOR
THE SECOND PHASE. SOME VERIFICATION MEASURES (E.G. VERIFICATION
OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS) WOULD NORMALLY EXTEND INTO AND
BEYOND THE SECOND PHASE. THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD BE PUT ON
NOTICE THAT VERIFICATION MEASURES CHOSEN FOR THE FIRST PHASE
MAY NEED TO BE ALTERED OR EXPANDED IN THE SECOND PHASE.

III. POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES

16. (LEFT BLANK TO AVOID RE-NUMBERING OF SUBSEQUENT
PARAGRAPHS.)

VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS

17. CLOSE OBSERVATION OF WITHDRAWALS IS AN IMPORTANT
ALLIED OBJECTIVE, AND HIGH PRIORITY SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO ITS
SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD INVOLVE THE DEPLOYMENT OF
INSPECTORATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE DURATION OF THE
WITHDRAWALS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMNT.

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THIS OBJECTIVE SEEMS TECHNICALLY SOUND AND WOULD NOT BE LIKELY
TO INVOLVE NATO IN UNACCEPTABLE RECIPROCITY.

VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

18. THIS OBJECTIVE IS OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIES
AS VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS. IT COULD INVOLVE THE ASSIGNMENT
OF INSPECTORATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOLLOWING WITHDRAWALS.
/THE INSPECTORATES WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN IN THE AREA OF
REDUCTIONS CONTINUOUSLY FOR A LONG AS THE MBFR AGREEMENT WAS IN
FORCE. IN PARACTICE, HOWEVER, IT MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY FOR THEM
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TO BE IN THE AREA AT ALL TIMES./ TEHE INSPECTORATES WOULD, IN
ADDITION TO MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT, HAVE ALL
OF THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE.
ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO ACHIEVE COMPLET ACCURACY
IN THE VERIFICATON OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, PARTICULARLY
IN PERSONNEL,IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO VEIFY COMPLIANCE IN
BROAD TERMS.

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VERIFICATION OF STABILISING MEASURES

19. IN NEGOTIATING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF
WITHDRAWALS AND POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, THE ALLIES SHOULD
TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANCE OF SUCH ARRANGEMENTS TO THE

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POSSIBLE VERIFICATION OF STABILISING MEASURES. /TO THE EXTENT
REQUIRED, THERE SHOULD BE OVERT INSPECTION F WHATEVER
STABILISING MEASURES ARE NEGOTIATED./

IV. SPECIFIC MEASURES

20. ASSESSMENTS IN THIS SECTION WERE MADE IN THE LIGHT
OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP REPORT ON "NEGOTIATED INSPECTION AND
VERIFICATION/ IN MBFR (AC/276-WP(73)43(REVISED) OF 30 NOVEMBER,
1973). THIS DOCUMENT, AS WELL AS THE US PAPER(4) ON "NEGOTIATED
INSPECTION IN MBFR" OF 5TH OCTOBER 1973 TO WHICH IT REFERS, ARE
AT ANNEX. ADDITIONAL DETAILED TECHNICAL STUDY WILL BE REQUIRED
ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING MEASURES PRIOR TO AGREEMENT. HOWEVER,
THE MEASURES COULD BE PRESENTED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO THE
SECRET

OTHER SIDE IN BROAD OUTLINE PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF TECHNICAL
STUDIES.

A. USE OF MOBILE TEAMS AND/OR FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS TO
MONITOR AGREED WITHDRAWALS

21. THIS MEASURE COULD INVOLVE EITHER OR BOTH OF THE
FOLLOWING:
(A) THE DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE TEAMS TO ACCOMPANY WITHDRAWING
UNITS FROM THEIR BARRACKS TO THE ROAD OR RAIL CROSSING
POINTS INTO THE USSR OR OTHER EXIT POINTS BEING USED
FOR WITHDRAWALS;
(B) THE STATIONING OF OBSERVERS AT FIXED POSTS AT THE ABOVE-
MENTIONED CROSSING POINTS. (SOME 25 MEN AT EACH).

22. FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, MOBILE TEAMS ARE
PREFERABLE TO FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS BECAUSE OF THEIR GREATER
FLEXIBILITY EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY; THEY ARE MORE DIFFICULT
TO CIRCUMVENT AND REQUIRE FEWER MEN TO STAFF. IN PRINCIPLE,
THEY CAN PERFORM ALL OF THE FUNCTIONS OF FIXED POSTS, WHILE
THE REVERSE IS NOT TRUE. THEY ALSO HAVE GREATER INTELLIGENCE
GATHERING POTENTIAL THAN FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS. IN THE
MONITORING OF WITHDRAWALS, THE CHIEF MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF
MOBILE TEAMS OVER STATIONED OBSERVERS IS THAT ONLY THE FORMER
COULD DETERMINE PRECISELY WHICH KINDS AND SIZES OF UNITS HAD
BEEN WITHDRAWN AND WHAT THE ORDER OF BATTLE HA BEEN AT
PARTICULAR MILITARY POSTS, USEFUL INFORMATON FOR POST-REDUCTION
ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS IN SUPPORTING OF MONITORING. BOTH SYSTEMS
ARE TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE AND WOULD INVOLVE NATO IN NO
UNACCEPTABLE RECIPROCITY WHETHER IMPLEMENTED ON THEIR OWN OR
AS A COMBINATION. HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY IN THE REDUCTION PHASE,
STATIC POSTS COULD PERFORM A MOST USEFUL FUNCTION AT MAJOR
EXIT POINTS. FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THEREFORE, THE
IDEAL SYSTEM WOULD BE A MOBILE ONE SUPPORTEDBY SOME STATIC POSTS.

23. /FOR WITHDRAWAL MONITORING, NEITHER SYSTEM HAS ANY

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SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ADVANTAGE TO NATO OVER THE OTHE, AND NEITHER
HAS SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DRAWBACKS. /HOWEVER, THERE ARE SOME
POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES TO FIXED POSTS FOR THE LONG-TERM
MONITORING OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS (SEE PARAGRAPH 28).
THEREFORE, DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND
SECRET

THAT AGREEMENT TO DFIXED POSTS TO MONITOR WITHDRAWALS MIGHT
MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO AVOID FIXED POSTS (SHOULD THIS BE
DESIRED) FOR THE MONITORING OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS.//

OR

/FOR WITHDRAWAL MONITORING NEITHER SYSTEM HAS ANY
SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ADVANTAGE TO NATO OVER THE OTHER. IN
THE FIRST PHASE, HOWVER, THE DEPLOYMENT OF INSPECTION TEAMS
SHOULD, BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE POLITICAL DRAWBACKS, BE LIMITED
AS SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 25 BELOW.X

24. THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONCEDE 21(B)
IN ORDER TO PROVE THAT THEY ARE FULFILLING THEIR SIDE OF AN
MBFR AGREEMENT. THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONCEDE 21(A) IS MORE
QUESTIONABLE, SINCE THE ABOVE-CITED ADVANTAGES TO THE WEST OF
MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS DISADVANTAGES BY THE SOVIETS.
HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING BOTH IS NOT EXCLUDED.

25. CONCLUSION: /BECAUSE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF MOBILE
TEAMS AND FOR REASONS OF NEGOTIATING TACTICS, THE ALLIES SHOULD
ATTEMPTTO NEGOTIATE 21(A) EXCLUSIVELY. ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS
PROVE NON-NEGOTIABLE, SHOULD THE ALLIES ADVANCE 21(B) TO THE
OTHER SIDE./

OR

/THE ALLIES SHOUL INITIALLY ATTMEMPT TO NEGOTIATE FOR
A COMBINATION OF BOTH SYSTEMS. IF THIS APPROACH PROVES ABORTIVE,
THEN A SYSTEM BASED ON MOBILE TEAMS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED, SINCE
INTER ALIA THIS IS THE SYSTEM WHICH SHOULD PROVE MOST EFFECTIVE
FOR VERIFICATION OF THE POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS (SEEPARA-
GRAPH 30 BELOW). ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS PROVE NON-NEGOTIABLE
SHOULD THE ALLIES ACCEPT THE SYSTEM DESCRIBED AT 21(B) ABOVE./

OR

/FOR VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS IN THE FIRST PHASE
THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE COULD BE ENVISAGED:

- WITHDRAWAL OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES SHOULD BE
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CARRIED OUT OVER A LIMITED NUMBER OF POINTS OF
DEPARTURE (ON THE WESTERN SIDE ADEQUATELY DISTRIBUTED
THROUGHOUT BELGIUM, GERMANY AND THE NETHERLANDS).

- FOR THE MONITORING OF WITHDRAWALS, INSPECTION TEAMS
SHOULD BE STATIONED AT THESE POINTS OF DEPARTURE
(EXIT POINTS)./

B. USE OF MOBILE TEAMS AND/OR FIXED POSTS (STATIC PERIMETER
POSTS AND/OR CHOKE POINT POSTS) TO MONITOR POST-REDUCTION
FORCE LEVELS

26. THE US PAPER OF 5 OCTOBER SUGGESTS A MINIMUM OF 10
TWO-MAN MOBILE TEAMS IN EAST GERMANY, 7 TO 8 TWO-MAN TEAMS IN
CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND 7 TO 10 TWO-MAN TEAMS IN POLAND. HOWEVER,
A NATO STUDY(5) HAS ADVOCATED THE MUCH LARGER TOTAL OF 130 TWO-
MAN TEAMS BASED ON 20 DIFFERENT SUB-HEADQUARTERS. BECAUSE OF THE
CONSIDERABLE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THESE TWO SUGGESTIONS, THE MBFR
WORKING GROUP IS PREPARING A NEW STUDY (6) CONTAINING
RECOMMENDATIONS AS TO THE APPROPRIATE NUMBER OF TEAMS. IT WOULD
BE IN NATO'S PURELY MILITARY INTEREST TO ACHIEVE A MAXIMUM
DENSITY OF TEAMS. HOWEVER, CAREFUL CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN
TO THE NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT INSPECTION PERSONNEL WHICH COULD
BE TOLERATED ON ALLIED TERRITORY FROM A DOMESTIC POLITICAL
POIINT OF VIEW KEEPING IN MIND THAT THIS VERIFICATION PROVISION
WOULD PROBABLY LAST AS LONG AS THE MBFR AGREEMENT REMAINE IN
FORCE.

27. STATIC PERIMETER POSTS AND/OR CHOKE POINT POSTS(7)
COULD BE USED /IN PLACE OF OR/AS A SUPPLEMENT TO MOBILE TEAMS.
AS THEIR NAMES IMPLY, THEY WWOULD BE LOCATED PRIMARILY AT KEY
CROSSING POINTS ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND
AT MAJOR TRANSPORTATION HUBS WITHIN THE AREA. HOWEVER, MOBILE
TEAMS ARE PREFERABLE FOR THE MILITARY REASONS LISTED IN PARA-
GRAPH 22 TO STATIC POSTS WHICH, ON THEIR OWN, WOULD BE A VERY
POOR AND EXPENSIVE WAY OF TRYING TO VERIFY POST-REDUCTION FORCE
LEVELS.

28. /POLITICALLY, MOBILE TEAMS ARE PREFERABLE TO FIXED
POSTS SINCE THE LATTER, AND PARTICULARLY THE PERIMETER POSTS,
COULD BE INTERPRETED AS DELINEATING A SPECIAL REDUCTIONS ZONE
SECRET

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ACDA-19 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

SAM-01 DRC-01 /152 W
---------- 114277
R 101835Z MAY 74
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5596
SECDEF WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASY LONDON
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
USNMR SHAPE

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OR

/POLITICALLY, MOOBILE TEAMS AS WELL AS FIXED POSTS MAY
CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE ALLIED COUNTRIES WHOSE TERRITORIES WOULD
BE AFFECTED, PARTICULARLY AS THEIR ACTIVITIES, IN MONITORING
POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, WOULD NECESSARILY BE EXTENDED TO
AN INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. IN ADDITION, PERIMETER POSTS
COULD BE INTERPRETED AS DELINEATING A SPECIAL REDUCTIONS ZONE
IN CENTRAL EUROPE./

29. MOBILE TEAMS MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE THATN
FIXED POSTS, CINCE THE OTHER SIDE MIGHT PERCEIVE OF THE FORMER
AS LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO DECEPTION AND CIRCUMVENTION. /IN
PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, MOBILE TEAMS APPEAR NEGOTIABLE./

30. CONCLUSION: /THE ALLIESSHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO
NEGOTIATE THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF MOBILE TEAMS, AS OUTLINED IN B
ABOVE, AND SHOULD NEGOTIATE ADEQUATE ACCESS BY THESE TEAMS TO
KEY TRANSPORTATION ROUTES INTO AND WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.
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SINCE PERIMETER POSTS AND CHOKE POINT POSTS ARE A VERY POOR
SECOND BEST TO MOBILE TEMAS, THEY SHOULD BE PROPOSED TO THE OTHER
SIDE ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS PROVE TO BE NON-NEGOTIABLE./

OR

/THE ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE THE USE OF
MOBILE TEAMS SUPPLEMENTED BY STATIC TEAMS AT CHOKE POINTS.
SHOULD THIS APPROACH FAIL, MOBILE TEAMS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED,
SINCE PERIMETER POSTS AND CHOKE POINT POSTS ARE A VERY POOR
SECOND BEST TO MOBILE TEAMS. HOWEVER, FROM THE MILTARY VIEW
ALONE A SYSTEM INVOLVING A REDUCED NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS WITH

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SOME STATIC POSTS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO A LARGER NUMBER OF
EITHER MOBILE OR STATIC POSTS ON THEIR OWN./

/FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW THE USE OF MOBILE TEAMS
SUPPLEMENTED BY STATIC TEAMS WOUD BE DESIRABLE. FOR POLITICAL
REASONS, HOWEVER, MOBILE TEAMS SHOULD NOT BE PROPOSED IN THE
FIRST PHASE. SHOULD NATIONAL MEANS NOT BE CONSIDERED
SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE TO MEET VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR
MONITORING NON-REDEPLOYMENT OF WITHDRAWN US AND SOVIET FORCES
IN THE FIRST PHASE, THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURE COULD BE ENVISAGED:

- MOVEMENTS OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES INTO THE NGA
(ROTATIONS ETC.) SHOUULD BE CONFINED BY AGREEMENT TO
CERTAIN RE-ENTRY POINTS, LIMITED IN NUMBER AND
IDENTICAL WITH THE POINTS OF DEPARTURE MENTIONED
ABOVE IN PARAGRAPH 25 (EXIT/RE-ENTRY POINTS);

- IN ORDER TO CONROL MOVEMENTS OVER THE AGREED EXIT/
RE-ENTRY POINTS INSPECTION TEAMS COULD BE LOCATED
AT THESE POINTS;

- ANY MOVEMENTS OF US ANDSOVIET GROUND FORCES INTO
THE NGA OTHER THAN OVER THE AGREED EXIT/RE-ENTRY
POINTS WOULD BE PROHIBITIED; COMPLIANCE WITH THIS
PROVISONN COULD BE MONITORED BY NATIONAL MEANS./

C. "OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL", I.E. THAT MANNED AIRBORNE
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RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS BE USED TO MONITOR AGREED
WITHDRAWALS AND/OR POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

31. THE SYSTEMS WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH A VARIETY OF
SENSORS, MOSTLY PHOTOGRAPHIC. INSPECTORS WOULD FLY ABOARD
AIRCRAFT BELONGING TO THE OTHER SIDE (NORMALLY TOTHE INSPECTED
COUNY), UTILISE SENSORS PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SIDE(8), AND BE
ACCOMPANIED BY LIAISON OFFICERS OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY. THE
FLIGHTS WOULD ORIGINATE IN THE INSPECTED COUNTRY, ADVANCE
NOTICE OF THE FLIGHTS WOULD BE GIVEN, AND THEY WOULD BE CARRIED
OUT ON PRESCRIBED ROUTES AND ALTITUDES. NATO SHOULD AIM FOR
MAXIMUM FLIGHT FREEDOM COMPATIBLE WITH MUTUAL POLITICAL
ACCEPTABILITY, FLIGHT SAFETY AND THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.

32. THE MAIN MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
OVER GROUND OBSERVATION LIES IN ITS ABILITY TO COVER LARGE
GEOGRAPHIC AREAS IN SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. A TECHNICAL DRAW-
BACK IN RELATION TO GROUND OBSERVATION IS THE SUSCEPTIBILITY
OF AIRBORNE SYSTEMS TO ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS. IN THE AREA
OF REDUCTIONS BAD WEATHER COULD FREQUENTLY PRECLUDE AERIAL
PHOTOGRAPHY. THIS MEASURE WOULD BE A COMPLEMENT TO GROUND
OBSERVATION - NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR IT.

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33. POLITICAL ADVANTAGES: THE APPLICATION OF THIS MEASURE
WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL
NATO COUNTRIES IN THIS FORM OF SURVEILLANCE, AS THE LEVEL OF
TECHNOLOGY IS WITHIN THEIR MEANS. THIS PARTICIPATION WOULD TEND
TO FOSTER PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY CONFIDENCE IN THE OBSERVANCE
OF THE AGREEMENT. POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES: THE GROUND PERSONNEL
AND
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OR

/AN OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM SHOULD COVER WITHDRAWALS,
POST-REDUCTION FOCE LEVELS, AND, TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED,
COLLATERAL STABILISING MEASURES. IN THE FIRST PHASE (WITHDRAWAL
OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES) THE ALLIES SHOULD NEGOTIATE, FOR
THE MONITORING OF WITHDRAWALS, A SYSTEM OF INSPECTION TEAMS AT
A LIMITED NUMBER OF POINTS OF DEPARTURE. THE MONITORING OF POST-
REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS (NON-REDEPLOYMENT) SHOULD BE ACHIEVED BY
CONFINING ALLOWED MOVEMENTS INTO THE NGA TO THE AFORE-MENTIONED
POINTS OF DEPARTURE (IDENTICAL EXIT AND RE-ENTRY POINTS) AND
STATIONING INSPECTION TEAMS AT THESE POINTS. FOR MONITORING
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESTRICTION OF MOVEMENTS TO THE AGREED EXIT/
RE-ENTRY POINTS THE ALLIES SHOULD RELY ON NATIONAL MEANS. THE
VERIFICATION SYSTEM TO BE PROPOSED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME FOR THE
SECOND PHASE WILL BE SUBNJECT TO THE OUTLINES OF THE AGREEMENTS
THEN ENVISAGED AND TO FURTHER EVALUATION OF THE POLITICAL
PROBLEMS INVOLVED./

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FOOTNOTES:

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(1) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IS PREPARING A REPORT ON THE AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL WARNING TIME WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM MBFR (AND FROM OVERT INSPECTION INTHE MBFR CONTEXT). THE LATEST DRAFT IS AC/276-WP(73)32(3RD REVISE).

(2) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IS PREPARING A REPORT ON THE AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL WARNING TIME WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM MBFR (AND FROM OVERT INSPECTION IN THE MBFR CONTEXT). THE LATEST DRAFT IS AC/276-WP(73)32(3RD REVISE).

(3) REFERENCE IS MADE TO AC/276-D(72)1 ON ACCEPABILITY OF INSPECTION TO NATO.

(4) IT IS ENVISAGED TO ATTACH THOSE PORTIONS OF THE 5TH OCTOBER US PAPER TO WHICH THE MBFR WORKING ROUP REPORT REFERS.

(5) AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED), PARAGRAPH 27 OF APPENDIX B TO ANNEX.

(6) REFERENCES: AC/276-WP(74)5(3RD REVISE) AND AGV(74)34.

(7) THESE FIXED POSTS ARE DESCRIBED IN THE US PAPER OF 5 OCTOBER, PAGES 45-50.

(8) ONE DELEGATION OBSERVED THAT THEMODALITIES OF AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE, E.G. THE QUESTION OF USING SENSORS PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SIDE, WILL REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IS CURRENTLY PREPARING A REPORT ON THE MILITARY/TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF AERIAL INSPECTION (REFERENCES: AC/276-WP(74)9(REVISED) AND (74)9/1; AGV(74)33.
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Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
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Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
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